Based on the documents of the United Nations, it is worth attempting to produce a rough sketch of the impact of the Hungarian events of October-November 1956 on the international politics, form a rather untypical view of Czechoslovakia. The main forum of the international relations, where the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution gained considerable significance, was the UN. The Second emergency session of the General Assembly (November 4, 1956), initiated by the United States, and the 11th session of the General Assembly (November-December 1956), produced altogether ten resolutions asking the Soviet Union to withdraw their troops and the Kádár government to receive the UN secretary-general and UN observers. This study makes a survey of these documents, namely of resolutions Nr. 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007 (all of the ES-II), also of resolutions Nr. 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132 (all of the XIth Session). By quoting these UN documents, present study shows that the General Assembly provided an ideal playground for a particular ‘political see-saw game’, given that ‘its resolutions were far from being coercive measures, especially not when they condemned a superpower or its allies. Since this was a well-known fact in Moscow, the Americans were hoping that the Soviets, who had never shown the least concern about international public opinion, would not be seriously distressed’. As far as Czechoslovakia’s role is concerned in the above mentioned ‘political game’ over the Hungarian question on international level, votings by the Czechoslovakian delation in the General Assembly show that the country was particularly loyal and faithful to the Soviet Union. Its delagets were using an extremely Stalinistic phraseology while uncritically supporting the deeds of the Soviet Union, which, from historival view, are totally unexplainable.