Comparing the data of the two last population censuses three important changes can be seen: 1. first of all the rate of those respondents who had not answered the question on religious denomination substantially dropped from 17% to 3%; consequently (2.) the rate of those who classify themselves to one of the denominations increased to 84% (this increase is striking mainly in case of Rom\u00e1n Catholics); (3.) at the same time there were more respondents with no denomination.<\/p>\n
These changes are fundamentally connected with the loosening of social climate after 1989 (who due to several reasons did not want or did not dare to confess themselves before, although in 2001 classified themselves to a denomination). Although it was proved that the increase of the number of people with religious denomination is one of the forms of the manifestations of social conformity, that the most simply could be interpreted that it is fashionable, and in certain cases it is an interest to be religious. Comparing the religiousness of Hung\u00e1ri\u00e1n and Slovak youth the following can be stated: 1. denomination statistics mentioned in the introduction form only a very wide frame of religiousness that is in practice f\u00fcled with various content. Although remaining only on the lev\u00e9l of denominations we can state that the examined population either remains to its original denomination, or lefts it and becomes of no denomination. Change between denominations is minimai and is experienced mostly in the case of Slovaks. Changing sides to so-called religious movements is not characteristic at all. 2. According to the examined dimensions the Hungarians are more religious than Slovaks. Rejecting religion and uncertainty is characterised for Slovaks. 3. Both between Hungarians and Slovaks those form the minority who are strongly believed to be religious (church religion). At the same time there are more such people in the case of Slovaks. 4. 28% of Hungarians and 22% of Slovaks from the introduced types form a certain transitional type(s), that is considering the majority of youth it is not true that they are church religious, but ev\u00e9n that they are not religious.<\/p>\n
We can assume that they can be mainly characterised by the state named by Lambert cultural religiousness that means uncertain faith and weak practice of the religion and that is the consequence of conscious separation from church as religious authority. For these young people Christianity is not truly religious, rather a cultural self-interpretation independent from religion. At the same time, it can not be viewed entirely as a prof\u00e1n\u00e9 cultural self-classification, since these people consider themselves religious.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Comparing the data of the two last population censuses three important changes can be seen: 1. first of all the rate of those respondents who had not answered the question on religious denomination substantially dropped from 17% to 3%; consequently (2.) the rate of those who classify themselves to one of the denominations increased to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":864,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[555,568],"tags":[],"post_year":[54,56],"coauthors":[244],"class_list":["post-1256","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-forum-social-science-review","category-studies","post_year-54","post_year-2005-2"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n