Andor Jaross as a created hero of the returned Felvidék
https://doi.org/10.61795/fssr.v26y2024i5.02
Abstract: Andor Jaross (1896–1946) is principally known as a Minister of Interior in Hungary after the Nazi’s occupation. He is also one of the most emblematic personages responsible for the deportation of the Hungarian Jews in 1944. After the First Vienna Award, when the southern parts of (Czecho)Slovakia were reannexed to Hungary, Jaross protected the dictatorial aspirations of Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Imrédy. In return, he was nominated for the Minister of the Felvidék. According to the press articles, right after the reannexation in 1938 (what was at that time commonly referred to as “the return to the Motherland Hungary”), Jaross became a “hero” in the returned regions, where he made all the decisions in practice, such as verification procedures, land distributions, and Jewish exemptions. Based on press materials of the examined period, this study poses the main question: What characteristics define the hero image of Jaross after 1938? It also highlights the negative consequences of the acceptation of this heroic role that was related to the “liberation” of Felvidék, his right-wing radicalization, and his views on the Jewish issue and the land distributions.
Keywords: Andor Jaross; returned Felvidék; created hero; de-Jewification; land issue.
Introduction[1]
Andor Jaross is known as the Minister of Interior of Hungary in 1944 after the German occupation. He is also among the most emblematic persons responsible for the deportation of the Hungarian Jews in 1944. However, it is less known that Jaross defined himself as a “democratic” politician between the two World Wars. It is also less known that after the First Vienna Award he quickly changed his views in many ways and started to be a loyal follower of the Hungarian government. Jaross embraced Hungarian Prime Minister Imrédy’s dictatorial aspirations, and in return he became Minister of the Felvidék after the reannexation of the territory in 1938. He instantly became a revered leader in the returned regions, where he made all the decisions in practice.
This study focuses on the political career of Andor Jaross after the First Vienna Award and examines the advantages and disadvantages of the “created hero” image. Based on press articles, I pose the following question: What characteristics defined the hero image of Jaross after 1938? I also highlight the negative consequences of the acceptance of this heroic role, his right-wing radicalization, and the changes of his views on the “Jewish question” and land issues. In any case, the main aim of the study is to draw an objective image of Andor Jaross after 1938.
From the childhood until the Vienna Award
Andor Jaross was born in Komáromcsehi on May 23, 1896. His birthplace, which was annexed to Czechoslovakia by the Trianon decision, was home not only to Slovaks and Hungarians but also to a small number of Jews. According to the 1910 census, 80.7% of the 596 inhabitants of Komáromcsehi were Slovaks, compared with a negligible 18% of Hungarians, 1.3% of Germans and 1.3% of Jews (i.e., Israelites; Kepecs 1996: 40).
Jaross was brought up in a religious environment in a close-knit family, and from 1906 he continued his secondary education at one of the most prestigious Catholic institutions, the Piarist Gymnasium (i.e., secondary school) in Tata. During his students years, he was the president of the literary circle named after Miklós Révai, and he also achieved great results in athletics. He graduated with distinction (Czáboczky 2019: 14–16).
His religious practice was primarily determined by the expectations of others, especially his wife. This is shown, for example, by the fact that he admitted that he went to confession mainly in response to his wife’s requests. He later stressed that there was never an anti-Semitic atmosphere in his family (Szirmai 1993: 133).
Andor Jaross became involved in Hungarian politics in Czechoslovakia almost immediately after the change of state in 1918–1920. In the 1920s, he first joined the National Christian Socialist Party led by János Lelley, but he left the party because of a speech by the party chairman in Nitra.[2] In 1921, he became member of the Kisgazdapárt (hereafter referred to as Small Farmers’ Party [SFP]) where he became co-chairman of the agricultural section. In 1925, he was elected as one of the national vice-presidents of the Magyar Nemzeti Párt (hereafter referred to as Hungarian National Party [HNP]), the successor of the SFP. In 1926, he became chairman of the agricultural section of the party’s district of Érsekújvár and in 1928 chairman of the HNP in the Komárom district. In 1929, he was also elected to the Provincial Assembly in Slovakia, and in 1931 he became vice-president of the Hungarian League of People’s Unions.[3]
In the 1920s, Jaross’s political objectives focused mainly on promoting the economic organization of the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia. At the same time he was also advocating the revision of the Czechoslovak land reform.[4] The young politician was personally interested in the land redistribution, as the nationalist Czechoslovak land reform had reduced the Jaross estate to some 500 cadastral acres (Czáboczky 2023: 91). Jaross’s domestic policy in the 1920s took a “middle-ground” position compared with the policies of the leaders of the Nemzeti Keresztényszocialista Párt (hereafter referred to as National Christian Socialist Party [NCS]) or the Hungarian National Party (Czáboczky 2019: 31).
Jaross’s radicalization to the right became increasingly evident from the early 1930s. The young politician, who had an upwardly mobile career, and from 1935 also served as the executive chairman of the HNP, the most important opposition party of the Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia, was still a proponent of the so-called “modern nationalism,” which emphasized the link between the social and national interests of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. Jaross, who was described by Lujza Esterházy as a “liberal,” felt it important to stress that the modern nationalism he advocated could not be identified with “minority-suppressing chauvinism” (Esterházy 1991: 68). In the spirit of “minority Hungarian nationalism,” the politician organized, for example, a youth group and section within the HNP called Fiatal Magyar Munkaközösség (Young Hungarians Working Group; Czáboczky 2023: 104).
The first half of the 1930s, in the context of the Night of the Long Knives, he warned Hungarians against Fascist principles.[5] In the second half of the 1930s, Jaross’s “nationalism” took on a new color, and in many respects his policies became increasingly close to Hitler’s ideas.[6] This remark is no coincidence, since Jaross had already been sharply critical of the Paris Peace Treaty since the 1920s, and as it fell apart, he moved closer and closer to the “anti-Versailles” policies of Mussolini and Hitler. This may have been partly due to the fact that he served with his brothers in the First World War, and his two brothers, who fought on the Italian front, were killed in action (Czáboczky 2019: 17). In any case, the transformation of Jaross’s political views is undoubtedly linked to Hungary’s foreign policy orientation, which in the second half of the 1930s, in the context of the interests of revisionism, became increasingly close to Germany.[7]
Andor Jaross as an “all-powerful leader” after the reunification
As mentioned earlier, Andor Jaross played a major role in Hungarian politics in Czechoslovakia from the beginning of the 1920s. His role grew in the 1930s, and in 1936 he became the leader of the Egyesült Magyar Párt (hereafter referred to as the United Hungarian Party [UHP]), which was a merger of opposition Hungarian parties in Czechoslovakia. These minority processes were related to the changes in Hungarian foreign policy imbued with revisionist ideas. As far as we know, Jaross was not a very popular or well-known figure among Hungarians in Czechoslovakia: “Before the Reunification […] Jaross was not particularly popular within the United Hungarian Party. After the Vienna Award, he was quickly elevated—undeservedly—by the press as a glorious leader, which he was able to use and quickly transform into influence. In December 1938, the slogan ’Jaross is our leader!’ appeared at the events of the United Hungarian Party, and this was not just an empty phrase, but Jaross as a party chairman really directed his party like a leader,” writes Attila Simon about the leader of the UHP, who became “all-powerful leader” of the Felvidék after the First Vienna Award (Simon 2014: 63).
Andor Jaross’s position was influenced after the reunification, primarily by Béla Imrédy. Not only was it in Imrédy’s interest to build a close relationship with Jaross, but the politician from the Felvidék also benefited from being Imrédy’s follower who appointed him Minister of the Felvidék and was given a free hand in the management of the affairs of the “returned” territories. The fact that János Esterházy[8] remained in his homeland and did not enter the stage of Hungarian domestic politics also contributed to Jaross’s becoming an influential figure in Hungarian politics after the First Vienna Award. Géza Szüllő, another important protagonist of the Hungarian politics in Czechoslovakia, who later became a member of the Upper House of the Hungarian Parliament and gained some political influence during the premiership of Miklós Kállay, had by then fallen out of favor in Budapest (Simon 2014: 61).
The alliance of interests with Imrédy after brought the expected success for Andor Jaross. This also meant to him unconditional acceptance of the government’s principles and loyalty to Imrédy. Jaross later said that he fully identified himself with the ideas of the Hungarian government, for example with the so-called “wonderful revolution,” because for the returning Hungarians were also interested in the connection of the national and social aims (See more on this in Sipos 1970). Imrédy was also well aware that the slogan of “ethnic solidarity” was popular among the “returned” political elites. Jaross therefore immediately adopted the social and political program of the UHP to Imrédy’s ideas. He ceaselessly emphasized that the “popular experience” of the society of the Felvidék was also an important benefit for the all-Hungarian society.[9]
It is no wonder that Jaross got a new position in Imrédy’s government. From November 16, 1938, he became the Minister of the Felvidék and continued to serve the community of the Felvidék in the framework of the Ministry of Felvidék. The “Office of the Minister without portfolio for Affairs of the Felvidék” was established under the supervision of Andor Jaross, which operated between November 15, 1938, and April 1, 1940, with 19 civil servants and had an advisory and consultative function in relation to the affairs of the Felvidék. His full power is well illustrated by the report of the Council of Ministers: “The legislation concerning the Felvidék can only be enacted with prior consultation with the Minister of the Felvidék; personal and material measures can also be taken after prior consultation with Jaross.”[10] He was therefore ultimately responsible for all matters concerning the reannexed territories, but he usually discussed the issues with specialized ministers (Simon 2014: 54). Jaross’s authority became inescapable in the affairs of the returned territories (See more in Sipos 1970). In other words, without Jaross, the ministers could not decide independently on any issue concerning the Felvidék. They had to consult Jaross on all matters concerning the returned Hungarian minority. In exchange for the absolute power, the 17 invited political representatives from the Felvidéki strengthened Imrédy’s government, which was in deep crisis in this period.[11] The UHP (commonly known as the Hungarian Party of the Felvidék), led by the newly appointed Minister of the Felvidék, was the only party in the Felvidék to operate (alongside the dwindling Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party in the Slovak villages), and Jaross also put his own people in county and district positions.[12] The minister’s people decided on the national-based verification commissions or the annulment of former land acquisitions (See more in Tilkovszky 1967: 58–59, 88).
Jaross as a “hero created by the press”
The press of the Felvidék and the government press also played a mayor role in creating the heroic image of Jaross. In the most important media organ, the Felvidéki Magyar Hírlap, the articles highlighted his role in the party unification process, and also the importance of his relations with Imrédy, and portrayed him as a leader or chief of the Felvidék. The head of the government also defined Jaross as the leader of the “returned” Felvidék and played a major role in creating the heroic image of the politician from Felvidék.[13]
On November 9, 1938, after the First Vienna Award, the Felvidéki Magyar Hírlap drew attention to the fact that Jaross’s personality was very popular not only in the Felvidék but also among the population of Budapest: “The most popular man in Budapest today is the chairman of the United Hungarian Party […]: Andor Jaross. For those who don’t know him by sight, he is the most popular leader of the Hungarian people in Hungary since his speech, which has created an unparalleled resonance in all strata of the Hungarian capital and among the Hungarian people as a whole.” When he traveled to Budapest, hundreds of acquaintances visited him, but this popularity was burdensome and uncomfortable for Jaross.[14]
It also emerges from the articles praising the Minister of the Felvidék that Jaross had risen to the position of „hero” primarily because of the reintegration. According to the published writings, the Hungarian society (including politicians) associated the events of the „return” with illusory ideas, and they were positively biased towards Jaross’s personality: “I have spoken to people of all political persuasions, and all of them look forward with hope to the involvement of the Hungarians of the Felvidék in Hungarian public life. They expect a lot from us. Only positive things, the simplification of Hungarian political life, a healthy levelling out, Hungarian unity, a new Hungarian impetus. And they see all this embodied in the strong, muscular, imposing young figure of Andor Jaross.”[15] However, the internal policy conflicts of the following months showed that opposition politicians often criticized Jaross’s unconditional loyalty to the government.[16] Jaross was also subject to severe critiques from the opposition side. He was criticized for his unconditional loyalty to the government and his policy turn regarding the Jewish question. However, Jaross was presented as a victim by the official press of the Felvidék. The Hungarian official press published articles trying to convince the public that Jaross was the best person to guarantee the great task of unification and reintegration after the return. The daily Magyar Nemzet on November 6, 1938, referred to the special tasks that only Jaross can guarantee: “We had to appoint a man to this serious task who could reconcile the forced provincialism of the Hungarians of the Felvidék with the traditions of universal Hungarian national politics and the great interests that lie along the line of our historical goals.”[17]
The “returning” society showed unconditional commitment to the minister, whom it regarded as an all-powerful “leader.” Many articles portrayed Jaross as the person who united the previously marginalized Hungarian minority community. At the same time, as a strong-handed leader, he gave hope and was a pledge of the unity to the “returned” inhabitants: “The Hungarians, who in 20 years of unanimous will had so often cried out with sincere admiration of the moment—’Long live Jaross!’—were waiting for their leader. The faces in the cold of the snowy December morning were flushed as if with the warm fire of joy and mutual rejoicing, and the hard peasant eyes were fixed on the minister’s pert, joyful face as a father looks at his now grown-up sons. Then the narrative began, and its unbroken continuity was seldom interrupted by the rapturous applause of the people.” Articles voicing biased opinions also overestimated Jaross’s previous political activities, and thus they tried to give Jaross’s earlier work a high profile.[18] These articles, moreover, often identified Andor Jaross with the “returned” society and the Felvidék. One such example was the article about Jaross’s internal political conflicts published on January 14, 1939, in the Felvidéki Magyar Hírlap.[19]
Jaross’s importance is shown in the fact that in the following months eight municipalities elected him honorary citizen, including as Komárom, Békés, Kiskunhalas, Léva, Munkács, Ipolyság, Udvard, and Bori, among which there were settlements outside the Felvidék as well (János 1940: 214).[20] In addition, one village was named after Jaross: the village Brusek and an adjacent foreign settlement, created by the dispossessed farmers of the Czech land reform in Udvard, were named Jarossfalva.[21] Jaross, who was blessed with excellent oratorical skills, used this “hero” image in his speeches. The local elites also tried to present him as the most important person in the Felvidék. For example, when Jaross arrived to the Felvidék, official events were preceded by long preparations. Such was the case when Jaross visited Komárom in order to attend the national congress of the United Hungarian Party. On January 18, 1939, Zsigmond Fülöp, the mayor of Komárom, hung up banners in the town that drew attention to the fact that “The Hungarians of Komárom are participating in this historic congress with true enthusiasm and greet the guests and Hungarian brothers and sisters with festive feelings. In order to express this feeling in a fitting way throughout the town, I invite the people of Komárom, especially the homeowners, to decorate their houses with flags on the day of the Congress.”[22] In his welcome speech the mayor assured the party leader of his support against the internal political debates.[23] According to press reports, members at the party congress in Komárom praised the Minister of the Felvidék in a poem set to the tune of the song of “Lajos Kossuth Said.” Jaross thus soon became a “hero” of the reunification, associated with the ideal of so-called “Hungarian freedom.”[24] At the same time, Jaross’s wife was also the subject of articles voicing biased opinion in the contemporary press. One such example was an article in the Felvidéki Magyar Hírlap of May 5, 1939, about a fund-raising campaign organized by the National League for the Protection of Children and the Children’s Sanatorium Association, where Jaross’s wife was leading a collection for children in the Felvidék.[25]
In January 1939, the merging with the Hungarian Life Movement and the leadership role alongside Imrédy also confirmed the importance of his role. His rapid political rise and his decisive role in late 1938 and early 1939 were largely linked to his relationship with Béla Imrédy. It seems from his “bombastic speeches” and “passionate editorials,” which, however, merely echoed Imrédy’s views in more simple terms, he sought to make up for the lack of independence with a show of strength and barrel-chested rants, his overwhelming “desire to appear” (Sipos 1970: 205).
Jaross’s role in the de-Jewification of the Felvidék
From the beginning, Jaross’s public speeches were focused on two crucial issues: the land distributions and the solution of the “Jewish question” in the Felvidék. He was influenced by Imrédy’s policy, who offered the Hungarian society a quick solution to these two issues (Bajcsi 2023b: 15). By promising a swift and complete resolution of critical issues, Jaross also wished to strengthen his own popularity among the “returned” society. As with other Hungarian politicians in Czechoslovakia, Jaross could have been expected to show loyalty to the Jews and to continue to cooperate with them: “Ask anyone in the Felvidék about this, but especially the illustrious witnesses of the good behavior of the Jews, such as the three leaders of the Hungarian minority in the Felvidék, Count János Esterházy, Géza Szüllő, and Andor Jaross, who had achieved historical merit.”[26] Unlike his two colleagues’, however, Jaross’s position took a major turn, and after the reunification he sought to portray the Jews of the Felvidék as a separate community from the Hungarians. Jaross embraced and continued to support Imrédy’s program of social reforms and identified himself with the prime minister’s anti-Semitic stance. Incidentally, Imrédy’s anti-Jewish sentiments must have been influenced at this time by the growing dissatisfaction with the first Jewish law among the “Christian middle class,” which was interested in acquiring Jewish wealth (Sipos 1966: 65).
The reassessment of the Jewish question may also have become timely, as the proportion of Jews in the country had increased dramatically with the reoccupation of the Felvidék.[27] As has been shown above, Andor Jaross played a major role in promoting anti-Jewish slogans and in spreading rumors about opportunistic (i.e., nationally disloyal) Jewry.[28] This stereotype, moreover, provided a good basis for his group, which was promoted to and organized around key positions at the county and district levels, to socially and economically marginalize Jews.
Jaross and his staff very quickly achieved the de-Jewification in the Felvidék (see more in Bajcsi 2023b). Jews were excluded from official positions, and their acquisition of property was in many cases nullified. In the months following the First Vienna Award, the main instrument for elite exchanges in the Felvidék was provided by the justification procedures.[29] In the Czechoslovak era, the honorable attitude towards Hungarians was reviewed not only in the case of the Jews but also among the reintegrated “Christian” Hungarians.[30]
The Hungarian National Councils operated during the period of the military administration and were built up within the structures of the UHP. Later, the verification committees under the control of the Minister of the Felvidék, on the one hand, tried to “keep the right people from the Felvidék in their positions and get them there,” taking into account the interests of the UHP from a national and moral point of view. On the other hand, they were effective instruments for the expulsion of Jewish officials (Bajcsi 2020: 22). In fact, Jaross managed to ensure that the UHP had considerable influence in the composition of the certification committees. Moreover he and his circle often prevailed in the decisions. It is also noticeable that Jaross and the UHP leaders were behind some of the negative decisions as wells. As Attila Simon notes in his work, “Jaross specifically drew the attention of the committee members to the fact that they could take as many negative decisions as they liked, as the pensions to be paid out would not be a burden on the state coffers” (Simon 2014: 94).[31] In the course of the screenings launched on the basis of verification procedures, the vast majority of the 11,000 Hungarians in the Felvidék passed without difficulty, while the Jews were almost entirely excluded from the state sector (Simon 2014: 90–91).[32] In the course of the justifications, the Jews were accused mainly of collaborating with the Czechs, one form of which was through donations for the protection of the state: “The Jews in Czechoslovakia are engaged in strong anti-Hungarian propaganda. They claim that Hungary is on the verge of revolution and is suffering great hardship. The Jewish reserve soldiers who enlisted on May 21 are said to have donated their entire pay to arm the army. The soldiers of Hungarian and German nationality refused to donate for the purpose of arming, despite the call to do so.”[33]
In the process of redistribution of industrial licenses, 60% of Jews were excluded from the economy of the Felvidék.[34] At the same time, it is well known that industrial licenses could be bought for 500–1000 pence (Simon 2014: 203). It is worth noting that while Jaross championed the so-called second Jewish law, he also wished to exempt “loyal Jews” who belonged to his circles.[35] These exceptions primarily affected those Jews with whom the minister had worked in the frame of the Hungarian National Party during the Czechoslovak period. Jaross’s influence on the Felvidék affairs is shown by the fact that he succeeded in including in the second Jewish law a section exempting nationally loyal Jews from the provisions of the discriminatory law.[36]
Andor Jaross and the land issue
Jaross’s statements of November 1938 already have shown that he attached great importance to the land settlement: “The problem of land reform is a national, popular, racial, military, and state-building interest. Whoever touches this question for a moment from the standpoint of individual or family politics is unworthy to speak for the nation. All such tendencies find themselves in opposition to us, our million-strong, self-conscious masses of the people. But the other reforms, including the reform of the Jewish law, are exclusively oriented towards the strengthening of the Hungarian race, of the popular forces.”[37] Jaross stressed that the lands thus taken would be returned to the Hungarian peasantry. He also pointed out at the UHP’s meeting in Ipolyság that it would be a good idea to extend this method to the whole country: “The land was taken away from the Hungarian landowners, but it was not given to the Hungarian peasantry. We will change this and, as we have promised the Hungarians in the Felvidék for 20 years, we will divide up the remaining estates and settlements. But we will also go further. Following our example, we want to fight for and promote a healthy land reform in the territory of the former Trianon Hungary.”[38]
For the Hungarian population in the Felvidék, land redistribution was a particularly sensitive issue because of the nationalistic nature of the first Czechoslovak land reforms between 1920 and 1935, during which Hungarians had received very little of the redistributed land. In southern Slovakia, where the Hungarian population constituted 70–90% of the inhabitants, Hungarians received merely 19% of the allotted land. Of the 140,000 hectares of land in southern Slovakia, only 27,540 hectares were in the hands of the Hungarian population. Of this land, 17,662 hectares were distributed as small allotments and 9,918 hectares as residual land.[39]
As a result, Jaross, together with several other politicians of the UHP, placed great emphasis on the revision of the Czechoslovak land reform. The fact that other UHP members besides Jaross were personally involved in the earlier land reform certainly played a role: “His father, István Jaross had some 352 acres confiscated him by the Czechs. Most of these lands could have had been returned to him by the Czech settlers. Despite his family belonging to the old land-owning nobility, he was one of the first among the nobles of the Felvidék to proclaim that the land belongs to those farmers of the Felvidék who had fought heroically alongside them in their political struggles for 20 years…. But there are other similar examples connected to the Jaross family. Vilmos Jaross also lost some 320 acres of land confiscated this way. Béla Szilassy, the state secretary, Nándor Nagy, and István Bartal renounced 320–420 acres of land.”[40] In charge of the revision of the Czechoslovak land distributions was an expert appointed by he Ministry of Agriculture as Jaross’s state secretary, Béla Szilassy, a landowner from Losonc, who had also previously been a member of the Hungarian party elite in Czechoslovakia. Under his leadership, the Government Commissariat for Land Settlement in the Felvidék was set up in March 1939. Szilassy had the power to decide whether beneficiaries could keep their former benefits. The revision of the Czechoslovak land reform started with the use of the lands of Czech colonists and residual landowners (Simon 2014: 122–123).[41] The plan drawn up by Szilassy and Jaross was clearly intended to compensate for the disadvantages suffered by the Hungarian population,[42] but Jaross also used it against the Jews, and the revision of the Czechoslovak land reform led to the unlawful cancellation of many Jewish land acquisitions (Simon 2014: 130).
In any case, Jaross promised a solution to the economic and social problems of the Felvidék through the “changing of the guard.” Soon afterwards, it became clear that the “de-Jewification” of the economy had caused serious problems for the economy of the Felvidék. At the same time, the press in the Felvidék continued to support Jaross on the Jewish law and land reform. In a May 1939 article, for example, it defended the minister against “Christians” who criticized his “permissive” attitude towards Jews. The article portrayed Jaross as a “victim” of the slanderers, while noting that “an atmosphere of mistrust will not succeed in strangling Jaross” voice. They will not be able to drive a wedge between Jaross and his supporters and will not be able to separate him from Teleki. Neither the young people of the Felvidék, nor the old people, nor the clergy could be turned against Jaross by the trumped-up false accusation of apostasy. Because no exaggeration was true, neither he nor the party could be accused of exaggeration or deviation from the program.[43]
However, as Jaross’s ministerial post did not fit in with the unificationist ideas of Pál Teleki, who succeeded Imrédy as prime minister, the post of minister without portfolio was abolished (Simon 2014: 130). This was due to the demise of the UHP by his deepening conflict with Teleki beginning in the summer of 1939. For the prime minister, the dangers of the extreme right-wing grouping around Imrédy and Jaross within the governing party became increasingly apparent (Simon 2014: 74). In addition, Teleki had been an advocate of unification against the corpus separatum from the outset, and Jaross’s corruption scandals had led him to seek to dismantle the ministry as soon as possible (See more in Tilkovszky 1967: 58–59, 88). However, as Jaross and his circle had control over the political and administrative affairs in Felvidék, the protégé of the minister could only be removed gradually, also leading to the abolishment of the ministry (Sipos 1970: 204). After the disbanding of the Ministry of the Felvidék in the summer of 1940, Szilassy’s position was also abolished and his duties were taken over by the Minister of Agriculture. By this time, the Hungarian government was already in favor of unification (i.e., the application of the mother country’s practice in the Jewish question as well). However, the war did not allow a complete revision of the Czechoslovak land reform.
Conclusions
Andor Jaross’ career and political views were greatly influenced by the events of the First Vienna Award. The alliance of interests he formed with Béla Imrédy played a major role in the development of the previously unpopular Hungarian politician’s career in Czechoslovakia. The politician from the Felvidék became a loyal follower of Imrédy’s policies, including those of the so-called “miraculous revolution,” land distribution, and the Jewish problem, in return for which he was able to exercise full control over the “returned” territories. From November 1938, Jaross, as Minister of the Felvidék, was the almost absolute leader of the re-claimed territories, and the United Hungarian Party, which he also led, was virtually the only party in the Felvidék. According to the press of the Felvidék and in the articles of the governmental press, he became a hero among the society of the Felvidék and all Hungarians. However, Jaross, who in the meantime had also become a member of parliament, was increasingly criticized by the opposition of the government.
In any case, Jaross’s heroic rise could only have happened during a period when the revision was realized in the Felvidék. His position was also guaranteed by the previous relations with Budapest and the alliance of the interests with Imrédy. These circumstances created the opportunity for Jaross to rise to the heroic status almost instantly. This role required unconditional cooperation from the increasingly radical policies of the head of the government. Thus, Jaross, similar to Imrédy, promised a rapid and wide-ranging revision of the Jewish question and the land reform. In any case, radical responses to social and economic problems were closely related with the creating of “heroic” statesmen, who are able to show the picture of the perfect leader, such as Miklós Horthy in Hungary or Andor Jaross in the Felvidék. Despite this, Jaross relatively quickly lost his sway when Pál Teleki became the prime minister. The new government did not trust Jaross, who continued to be a follower of the ex-prime minister Imrédy. Teleki also criticized Jaross’s dubious affairs and his corrupt behavior and wanted to finalize the unification as soon as possible. Thereafter, Jaross continued to build his friendship with Imrédy, and in October 1941 they together founded the radical-right wing Hungarian Renewal Party.
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