Szemle Archive


La­jos Izsák: The dep­ri­va­tion of rights of the Upper Hun­ga­ri­ans and their remo­val from their nati­ve land 1944–1949

Upper Hun­ga­ry was lived by Hun­ga­ri­ans from the 11th century. After the Sec­ond World War the Hun­ga­ri­ans had to leave that territory, and/or were remo­ved from that territory. Accor­ding to the cen­sus in 1773 during Maria Tere­sa’s reign the Hun­ga­ri­an ter­ri­to­ry’s boun­da­ry was con­si­de­red to be in the line of Nyitra-Léva-Losonc-Rimaszombat-Rozsnyó-Jászó. Accor­ding to the popu­la­ti­on cen­sus in 1910 al­most 900 thou­sand Hun­ga­ri­ans lived on the ter­ri­to­ry that recent­ly belongs to Slovakia. The deca­des that pas­sed by from that time result­ed vast ethnic and lan­gu­a­ge chan­ges as well. The for­cib­le cham­pagne on Hun­ga­ri­an tea­ching com­men­ced after the chan­ge in 1918/19, when the new Cze­chos­lo­vak state expel­led mo­re than 100 thou­sand Upper Hun­ga­ri­ans from its nati­ve land. The prog­ram for estab­lis­hing the Cze­chos­lo­vak nati­o­nal state was com­ple­ted by Edvard Beneš and the Cze­chos­lo­vak immig­ra­ti­on gover­nment in Lon­don at the end of 1942, and at the begin­ning of 1943 it was com­ple­ted by deman­ding the expel of the Hun­ga­ri­an nati­o­na­li­ty popu­la­ti­on that was accep­ted in the spring of 1944 by the Cze­chos­lo­vak com­mu­nis­tic emig­ra­ti­on toget­her with the Sovi­et government.

The study intro­du­ces and ana­ly­ses in detail the reso­lu­ti­ons aga­inst Hun­ga­ri­ans that were valid from 1944, the con­se­qu­en­ces of the Kas­sa gover­nmen­tal prog­ram, the exe­cu­ti­on of the Beneš Decrees, the work of the Cze­chos­lo­vak Com­mit­tee for Reset­tle­ment in Hun­ga­ry, the so-called re-slovakisation, and the deci­si­ons of the peace con­fe­ren­ce in Pa­ris. At the same time the Hun­ga­ri­an poli­ti­cal parties, the work of the Nati­o­nal As­sembly and car­di­nal Min­dszen­ty Jó­zsef and their steps taken for the Upper Hungarians. Finally, he sum­ma­ri­zes in num­bers to the end of De­cem­ber 1948, 73 273 Slo­vak peop­le left Hun­ga­ry voluntarily, and/or 89 600 Hun­ga­ri­ans were depor­ted from Czechoslovakia. Plus anot­her 6000 persons, who offi­ci­al­ly „voluntarily” left for Hun­ga­ry, and 20-30 thou­sand peop­le were expelled, and many thou­sands came for accom­plis­hing their stu­di­es in Hun­ga­ry and to set­tle he­re later. The Hun­ga­ri­ans left in Upper Hun­ga­ry 160 thou­sand acres of land and 15 700 houses. The Slo­vaks left he­re 38 000 acres and 4400 houses. The Upper Hun­ga­ri­ans did not rece­i­ve any compensation.

Gá­bor Lel­kes: The Euro­pe­an Par­li­a­men­ta­ry Elec­ti­ons in Slo­va­kia in 2004

Bet­we­en 10th – 13th June, 2004 it was the sixth deci­si­on made on the com­po­si­tion of the Euro­pe­an Par­li­a­ment (hereinafter refer­red to as EP), that is the only insti­tu­ti­on of the Euro­pe­an Union of which com­po­si­tion is direct­ly elec­ted by the union’s citizens. At this occa­si­on in May in the Euro­pe­an Union that has grown to 25 members, an open oppor­tu­ni­ty born to al­most 338 mil­li­on elec­ting citi­zens to deci­de with their votes that during the fol­lo­wing 4 years which repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of poli­ti­cal par­ti­es will rep­re­sent their coun­try in the insti­tu­ti­on that has its seat in Brussels. The EP elec­ti­on in 2004 in Slo­va­kia and in the 9 new Euro­pe­an Union mem­ber sta­tes is of his­to­ri­cal character, since in these sta­tes the elec­ti­ons were orga­ni­sed for the first time.

The atmos­phe­re befo­re the EP elec­ti­ons in Slo­va­kia was cha­rac­te­ri­sed by a gene­ral indifference, com­pa­rab­le with the trend in the whole EU, although the elec­ti­on tired­ness of Slo­vak elec­ting citi­zens was even stren­gthe­ned by the mul­ti­ple pre­si­den­ti­al elec­ti­ons direct­ly befo­re the EP elections. At the Euro­pe­an Par­li­a­men­ta­ry elec­ti­ons held for the first time in Slo­va­kia 17 Slo­vak poli­ti­cal par­ti­es were pres­ent that had 188 candidates. The Slo­vak poli­ti­cal par­ti­es that ente­red to the EP con­si­de­red their elec­ti­on results as suc­cess and did not pay too much atten­ti­on to the fact that mo­re than 80% of voters indi­ca­ted with their absen­ce at the elec­ti­ons that they grew sick of the rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the domes­tic poli­ti­cal life. At the EP elec­ti­ons in Slo­va­kia the par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on was very low, 19,96% of elec­ting citi­zens voted, com­pa­red to the 45,7%-os ave­ra­ge in the Union that is also a nega­ti­ve record in the his­to­ry of the EU. Accor­ding to poli­ti­cal ana­lysts both the win­ning and the loo­sing par­ti­es of the EP elec­ti­ons should fast inter­pret the war­ning of elec­ting citi­zens – that stand al­most on the edge of apat­hy – that every fifth Slo­vak fami­ly lives from inco­me at the brim of pover­ty and these are the social prob­le­ms where the par­ti­es should orient inste­ad of their inter­nal and exter­nal fighting.

At­ti­la Si­mon: „There is a case” Sum­ma­ry on the State of His­to­ry Tea­ching at Hun­ga­ri­an Scho­ols in Slo­va­kia on the Basis of Ques­ti­on­na­i­re Sur­vey

It is a well-known fact that the state and qua­li­ty of nati­ve lan­gu­a­ge tea­ching is of deter­mi­ning impor­tan­ce from the aspect of the Hun­ga­ri­an mino­ri­ty’s pres­ent and futu­re in Slovakia. Not dea­ling with the prob­le­ms can be tra­ced back to the lack of long-term deve­lop­ment con­cep­ti­on of edu­ca­ti­on of Hun­ga­ri­ans living in Slovakia, of which draf­ting could be rea­li­sed only with the co-operation of pro­fes­si­o­nal orga­ni­sa­ti­ons and politics, as well. Although, the expe­ri­en­ce of the past show the lack of such discussions.
His­to­ry tea­ching at Hun­ga­ri­an scho­ols in Slo­va­kia bears all the ill­nes­ses of the domes­tic education. The cri­sis of his­to­ry tea­ching in Slo­va­kia (in Slo­vak and Hun­ga­ri­an language) start­ed befo­re the sys­tem changes. During the socia­lism this sub­ject was to beco­me the serv­ic­es of the system. The sys­tem chan­ges that took place in (Czecho)slovakia from 1989 put his­to­ry tea­ching to an enti­re­ly new situation. Rene­wal of his­to­ry tea­ching in Slo­va­kia from con­tex­tu­al point of view went rela­ti­ve­ly fast and smoothly. The coun­try’s in­te­rest on his­to­ry tea­ching remained, since the new poli­ti­cal lea­der­ship want­ed to use it for its own legi­ti­mi­za­ti­on again. Although, the ideo­lo­gi­cal con­tent was chan­ged to inter­na­ti­o­nal goals.
The study intro­du­ces the results of a sur­vey based on ques­ti­on­na­i­res exe­cu­ted in autumn of 2003. It sta­tes that his­to­ry tea­ching in Hun­ga­ri­an lan­gu­a­ge scho­ols in Slo­va­kia fights with seri­ous problems. Most of the respon­dents men­ti­o­ned as prob­lem the lack of sui­tab­le textbooks. This answer alter­na­ti­ve was mar­ked by mo­re than two-third of the respondents. The sec­ond most fre­qu­ent mar­ked prob­lem was the lack of qua­li­fi­ca­ti­on of his­to­ry tea­chers with Hun­ga­ri­an spi­rit that was mar­ked by mo­re than half of the respondents. Mo­re than half of the peda­go­gu­es mar­ked the lack of sui­tab­le tea­ching tools and qua­li­fi­ed pedagogues, the rest of the peda­go­gu­es thought that the cur­ri­cu­la were one of the rea­sons of the problems. From the given alter­na­ti­ves the less respon­dents answe­red the lack of a sui­tab­le fur­ther edu­ca­ti­on system.
Sum­ma­ri­zing the issue of tex­tbo­oks the most impor­tant seems to be the cre­a­ti­on of oppor­tu­ni­ti­es for choos­ing textbooks. It should be achi­e­ved that the peda­go­gue and the scho­ol through a peda­go­gi­cal prog­ram would choose the tex­tbo­oks to be used and of course that there would be an oppor­tu­ni­ty to choose. Besi­des the libe­ra­li­za­ti­on of the tex­tbo­ok mar­ket its pro­fes­si­o­nal con­trol is also very important, to enab­le our chil­dren to get to books that ref­lect the accept­ance and the valu­a­ti­on of tolerance, all kind of dif­fe­ren­ce (national, religious, etc.).
At our scho­ols teach his­to­ry peda­go­gu­es over and under forty years of age in the same extent. Although, our scho­ols are lac­king in qua­li­fi­ed young people. In the group of tea­chers youn­ger than 40 the rate of unqu­a­li­fi­ed peop­le is low. And this again stems from the low finan­ci­al and moral valu­a­ti­on of tea­chers – the unsol­ved prob­lem of tea­cher education. In Bra­ti­sla­va and Nitra mo­re than a dozen his­to­ry tea­chers accom­plish their studies. Although many of them does not work in this field.

Jó­zsef Kiss: Slo­va­kia’s Place and Role in Milan Hodža’s Geo­po­li­ti­cal Con­cep­ti­on (2. part)

Hodža’s draft draws the atten­ti­on to the con­nec­ti­on bet­we­en his geo­po­li­ti­cal con­cep­ti­ons and fore­ign poli­cy directions, and also to the ambi­va­lent cha­rac­ter of his ideas. He gives evi­den­ce of those dif­fi­cul­ti­es that arose during the imple­men­ta­ti­on of the com­plex­ly inter­pre­ted geo­po­li­ti­cal con­cep­ti­on to the fore­ign poli­cy direc­ti­on that exten­ded to the eco­no­mic and social, cul­tu­ral and civi­li­sa­ti­o­nal sphere. Hodža during the intro­duc­ti­on of the “Duna-plan” in efforts of taking it into real fra­me­work and during poli­ti­cal tem­po­ri­zing he did not for­get the moti­ves in con­nec­ti­on with Rus­sia and aris­ing from the neces­si­ty and fun­cti­on of joining, resul­ting from middle-European aspi­ra­ti­ons of Ger­ma­ny that had grown to threats. Hodža, to the con­tra­ry to Beneš, intend­ed to drop the impor­tan­ce of Czechoslovak–Soviet co-operation agre­e­ments and to main­ta­in the inde­pend­ence of Middle-Europe that was thre­a­te­ned by the agres­si­ve acts of Ger­ma­ny and to main­ta­in the dis­tan­ce with the acti­vi­ti­es of the Sovi­et Union, while it want­ed to find com­pro­mise with Germany. Apparently, Hodžá­nak had no illu­si­ons in con­nec­ti­on with Ger­ma­ny’s aggres­si­ve intents.

In this Hodža’s atti­tu­te taking into con­si­de­ra­ti­on of those geo­po­li­ti­cal abi­li­ti­es was pres­ent that result­ed that his con­cep­ti­ons did not loose their time­ly­ness under the recent con­di­ti­ons of the pro­cess of get­ting uni­ted in Europe.
Coor­di­na­tes of Slo­va­kia’s pla­ce­ment in Hodža’s geo­po­li­ti­cal con­cep­ti­on evi­den­ce efforts of cre­a­ting syn­cre­ti­cal equ­a­li­za­ti­on bet­we­en cat­ching con­nec­ti­vi­ti­es and poli­ti­cal expediency, and the dyna­mism fun­cti­o­ning with signs of per­ma­nent appro­rism and appropriatness, con­nec­ting susceptibility, the abi­li­ty to dis­co­ver with imagination, racio­na­lism with abstractness. Hodža’s geo­po­li­ti­cal con­cep­ti­on intend­ed to put Slo­va­kia into inter­na­ti­o­nal thinking.

Davi­de Torsello: Trust, Dis­trust and Social Rela­ti­ons at an East Slo­va­ki­an Vil­la­ge

Trust and dis­trust seem to be impor­tant con­cepts when we des­cri­be how indi­vi­du­als struc­tu­ra­li­se their acts, and/or how they report with other peop­le their ideas on social reality. Trust that cre­a­tes a rela­ti­on based on reli­an­ce bet­we­en par­ti­es that share a com­mon goal, holds the empha­sis on inter­ests and instru­men­ta­lism and an array of mutu­al expec­ta­ti­ons and res­pon­si­bi­li­ti­es from both sides. These are defi­ned on the basis of the prin­cip­les and rules of the community. Deep dis­trust to indi­vi­du­als and insti­tu­ti­ons is one of the reac­ti­ons pro­du­ced by indi­vi­du­als by which the vil­la­ge peop­le react on the situ­a­ti­on of pover­ty and eco­no­mic penu­ry during their eve­ry­day life. In every detail of the social life of indi­vi­du­als trust is in stake, since due to the lack of eco­no­mic sour­ces the indi­vi­du­als see the oppor­tu­ni­ty to sur­vi­ve in social interaction. In such con­di­ti­ons there is no place to prac­ti­ce the „blind“ and abso­lu­te trust, since (the social and economic) goods are lac­king from the life of individuals. At the same time dis­trust results res­pon­si­bi­li­ty in the pla­y­ers of the inte­rac­ti­on that is seen not in apat­hy and passivity, but in one acti­ve mode of living in gene­ral con­di­ti­ons of dis­trust and lack.

The inhab­i­tants of Krá­¾o­vá nad Váhom con­si­der the impor­tan­ce of social rela­ti­ons as the adap­ta­ti­on stra­te­gy to big his­to­ri­cal changes. How could the exis­tence of domi­nant expressed dis­trust be under­sto­od in the community? In instru­men­tal con­cep­ti­on in case of need fami­ly mem­bers are poten­ti­al­ly the most pro­fi­tab­le sour­ces of help. Since fami­ly rela­ti­ons are alwa­ys „blood relations“. Although, on the other hand, strong empha­sis on fami­ly rela­ti­ons has also nega­ti­ve sides. The pet­ri­fi­ed eti­qu­et­te of beha­ving and main­ta­i­ning tire­so­me social rela­ti­ons can le­ad to the accu­mu­la­ti­on of nega­ti­ve emo­ti­ons that can thre­a­ten the sen­si­ti­ve sys­tem of fami­ly relations.
Rela­ti­ons out of fami­ly and wit­hin a vil­la­ge are cha­rac­te­ri­sed by dif­fe­rent social aspects: these are not so long-term than the rela­ti­ons wit­hin family. Peop­le can use instru­men­tal trust on dif­fe­rent levels depend­ing on how much time (and power) is inves­ted to the relationship. Although, on the other hand even if the emo­ti­o­nal load is eas­i­er in rela­ti­ons out­si­de the fami­ly than in the rela­ti­ons wit­hin the family, cap­ri­ci­ous­ness of rela­ti­ons out­si­de the fami­ly is stronger. Hen­ce, with the growth of dis­tan­ce bet­we­en the indi­vi­du­als the cog­ni­ti­ve map of trust beco­mes mo­re complex. At this point the usage of dis­trust can beco­me of stra­te­gic impor­tan­ce and the expressed dis­trust bet­we­en the vil­la­ge habi­tants does not ref­lect the lack of forms of asso­ci­a­ti­ons or ci­vil col­lec­ti­ve actions, as some of the the­o­ri­es seem to declare.
Using dis­trust is express­ing tense that is pres­ent bet­we­en dif­fe­rent lay­ers on which trust is based and with the help of which it is maintained. By using direct dis­trust vil­la­ge peop­le are able to cre­a­te balan­ce bet­we­en fol­lo­wing per­so­nal inter­ests and the con­struc­ti­on of social and cog­ni­ti­ve trust. Hen­ce, dis­trust beco­mes the sup­ple­ment of trust and at the same time the tool for cre­a­ting attach­ment bet­we­en the peop­le in uncer­ta­in times.

Va­lér Ve­res: Futu­re Plans in the Cir­cle of the Hun­ga­ri­an Mino­ri­ty Youth and the Majo­ri­ty Youth in the Con­text of Social and Ori­gin Bac­kground

Futu­re plan­ning of the Hun­ga­ri­an mino­ri­ty youth and the majo­ri­ty living in the Car­pat­hi­an Basin is on the one hand deter­mi­ned by the regi­on’s gene­ral social and eco­no­mic state, and on the other hand by the situ­a­ti­on of the social layer wit­hin the reg­ion. In the cir­cle of those young peop­le who live in bet­ter con­di­ti­ons in the regi­ons – eit­her the Hun­ga­ri­an mino­ri­ty or the majo­ri­ty – signs of the len­gthe­ning of youth life period, len­gthe­ning of life period at scho­ols and the expan­sion of edu­ca­ti­on is visible. These chan­ges pro­mote the expan­sion of post-material valu­es that form the bac­kground of the sec­ond demog­rap­hic tran­si­tion of a Van de Kaa-type. These results con­firm that sta­te­ment that the East-Middle-European chan­ges in having a baby and postpo­ning the time for fami­ly plan­ning and get­ting mar­ri­ed are pres­ent not main­ly in the regi­ons that are in disad­van­ta­ge­ous situ­a­ti­on after the sys­tem changes, but on the contrary, in mo­re advan­ta­ge­ous regi­ons (our exam­ples are main­ly the young peop­le from the majo­ri­ty in East Slovakia, from which many live in the pros­pe­rous Bratislava).
The social and ori­gin bac­kground wit­hin the regi­ons also very sig­ni­fi­cant­ly arti­cu­la­tes futu­re strategies. Main­ly in the urba­ni­sed regi­ons – like Bel­ső-Er­dély, Fel­vi­dék and Vaj­da­ság – sig­ni­fi­cant dif­fe­ren­ti­a­ti­on by social bac­kground can be seen. To the futu­re plans we assig­ned youth groups having spe­cial social pro­fi­le that to a cer­ta­in extent har­mo­ni­ze with the class spe­ci­fic habits of Zinnecker-type and youth ideology. Young peop­le with bet­ter eco­no­mic and cul­tu­ral background, the „elite“ chose enter­pris­ing cha­rac­te­ris­tic of eco­no­mic class fraction, and the cul­tu­ral class frac­ti­on chose fur­ther study or mo­re abstract, inde­pend­ent way of life that is one of the signs of beco­ming inde­pend­ent in young life, and as such is the expres­si­on of the pro­cess of youth period changes. These chan­ges are pres­ent in Szé­kely­föld and Kár­pát­al­ja even less slightly, but in the cir­cle of young peop­le in towns its signs are visible.
Inten­ti­on to work abro­ad in Er­dély are sig­ni­fi­cant­ly strong, of which ma­in rea­son is that the most part of young peop­le is besi­de the chan­ge of atti­tu­des in con­nec­ti­on with the expan­sion of edu­ca­ti­on and fami­ly plan­ning is for­ced to rea­li­se its futu­re plans that are com­pa­red with the oppor­tu­ni­ti­es „demanding“ abroad. This for­cing power is seen in every reg­ion, but in dif­fe­rent extent and for­ces the young peop­le of majo­ri­ty and the local Hun­ga­ri­an young peop­le to emig­ra­te in the same extent. Although the oppor­tu­ni­ti­es to work abro­ad in the neig­hbou­ring Hun­ga­ry are mo­re rea­li­sab­le for the Hun­ga­ri­an young people, the­re­fo­re fol­lo­wing the recent trends, there are mo­re Hun­ga­ri­ans who emigrate.